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This research looks into the public debate surrounding the release o f proposed
voluntary National History Standards within the context o f the 1990s culture wars in the
United States. The goal is to offer a glimpse into how history education is tied with
notions o f culture, and how conceptions o f history and national identity were manipulated
by individuals, spear headed by former NEH chairwoman Lynne Cheney, with a political
motive. The author gives a brief context o f the United States’ during the mid-1990s,
including tenuous issues o f race, gender, sexuality and multiculturalism. The origins and
development of the national history standards are laid out, including the internal debates
over multiculturalism during their development. The focus shifts to the media attacks a
number o f conservatives launched against the standards, claiming they were too
culturally liberal, and were an attempt at white washing our nations’ history. It is pointed
out that these attacks coincided precisely at a pivotal political moment for conservatives

in the Capitol, just at the time o f the 1994 Republican takeover o f the house, and that
these attacks on the standards were a way to capitalize on conservatives’ new power. The
conclusion focuses on the end o f the debate after the Senate Resolution in January, 1995.
The New York Times editorial pages became a hot bed for the debate, and reveal a
behind-the-scenes connection among the conservatives criticizing the standards, further
acting as evidence that the conservative assault was coordinated.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

In early October, 1994, after two years o f painstaking negotiation and discussion
went into their development, a set o f voluntary national standards for history in grades
kindergarten through twelve were set to be published and released to the public.
Developers hoped that schools would choose to use them as a guideline in their history
and social studies curriculums, bringing American students up to date on historical
content as well as critical and analytical skills. This project was part o f a larger vision
which had been known under two different names since 1988: America 2000 and Goals
2000. Both had as their aim the establishment o f accepted standards in certain core
subjects in school.
This was not a partisan issue to begin with. After all, it was Republican president
George H.W. Bush who pushed for it in the 1980s under the name America 2000, and it
was Democratic president Bill Clinton who continued it in 1994 with only minor changes
under the name Goals 2000. The subjects o f English, mathematics, science, history and
geography were to have standards developed for them. Goals 2000 expanded the list of
subjects to include foreign languages, civics and government, and economics. None of
them met controversy, except history.
Just before the National Center for History in the Schools (NCHS) was to release
the mandated history standards to the public, former chairwoman o f the National
Endowment for the Humanities Lynne Cheney attacked them in the Wall Street Journal
on October 4th, 1994 in an op-ed titled “The End o f History.” This marked the beginning

o f a concerted effort by a number o f conservatives to decry, via the media, the history
standards as wrongheaded at best and aberrantly biased at worst. This offensive would
ultimately defeat any impact the developers hoped the standards might have on history
education. What unfolded next ended in a public relations victory for the political right,
and the short-lived loud debate is a testament to how culture can be open to conscious
manipulation “from above” by those with means to power and access to media.
There has been a wonderful work on this controversy written by three individuals
who were involved in most o f the standards’ development. Gary B. Nash, Charlotte
Crabtree, and Ross E. Dunn published History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching
o f the Past in 1998 in order to situate “the attacks on the history standards in the larger
culture wars o f the last decade” in the hopes that it will allow “a greater appreciate o f
what is at stake and how history education in the schools can be held hostage to political
agendas.” 1
The authors do a great job o f tracing the development o f the standards, and in
doing so show they know the standards debate was used for political ends. Sometimes the
authors find it hard to hide their own political biases; and, having been intimately
invested in the process, they seemingly refuse to admit the Senate censure o f the
standards and its following re-edit by the moderately conservative Council for Basic
Education (CBE) was an ultimate cultural and political victory for the Right. So
completely were the original standards politically toxic that even the Democratic
administration o f Bill Clinton would eventually come out against them.

1 Gary Nash, Charlotte Crabtree and Ross E. Dunn, History on Trial (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1998), xi.

To its credit, the focus o f History on Trial is how, after all the negative fanfare the
standards received, the NCHS was able to go back, revise them, and re-release them on
April 3, 1996. This second version o f standards received far less negative attention from
conservatives. Out o f this second release, Nash, Crabtree, and Dunn chose to find their
victory. The Senate did not censure or even vote on the revised standards, and they were
distributed to schools nation-wide. However, the revised standards did not receive nearly
as much media notice as the first ones did in late 1994 and early ’95. No one paid much
attention; at this point every media outlet was mostly consumed by the upcoming
presidential election. In this respect, the history standards and advocates o f multicultural
history lost the public contest. This thesis contends that the fight over public perception
had been won by the conservative right. By controlling the direction o f the media
conversation over history, conservatives had managed to publicize and find support for
traditional notions o f American themes. And in so doing, derail the standards’ authors’
attempts to update school history to be more in line with modem academic historical
research.
The national history standards controversy o f 1994-1996 also provides us with a
clear glimpse into how conscious cultural manipulation can occur when put forward by a
determined institution or group. There was a concerted endeavor by a certain group of
conservatives to turn the issue o f national history standards into an opportunity to
influence cultural dialogue; and the mass media o f television, radio and newspapers
provided the medium for their efforts.

Conceptions of Cultural History

Culture is a slippery term, and depending on who one asks, the definition may
vary. For the purposes o f this thesis, culture can be construed as shared behaviors and
basic ideologies that certain people feel distinguish them from other people. Some people
feel comfortable believing cultures start and stop at national borders, and there are
debates over what a culture should and should not include.
To assert that the national history standards debate was an effort at conscious
cultural manipulation through control o f public dialogue is to take a side in the field o f
cultural history. It is important to demarcate the two broadest conceptions o f cultural
legitimation within the field before one goes further.
A number o f historians and cultural scholars hold a view known as cultural
populism. According to this analysis, cultural norms and legitimation move generally in a
bottom-up direction. That is, cultural traditions are born, maintained and challenged
organically, making it important to investigate things like folklore in earlier societies, and
not just politics, war and the decrees o f rulers. In studying industrialized societies, the
analytical focus shifts from folklore to mass popular culture. This includes things like
films, radio and television shows, music and popular news outlets.
Cultural populists hold that the mass o f people in industrialized society have real
cultural power, producers o f mass media merely respond to the cultural tastes o f the
populace at large. These cultural norms originate with the masses and are then helped
spread by mass media, which acted as a reinforcer. Historian Lawrence W. Levine
epitomized this populist view when he noted, “People did not passively accept whatever

popular culture was thrown their way; they preselected the culture they exposed
themselves to by learning to decipher reviews and coming attractions, by understanding
the propensities o f authors, actors, and directors to whose work they had been exposed to
in the past, and by consulting members o f their communities.”2 This alleged agency
among individuals within the masses translates into power over culture legitimation.
Their choices force cultural producers to drop certain ideas, to emphasize others and
adapt to demand. This view o f the power o f the masses conflicts directly with the other
broad conception o f cultural history: cultural pessimism.
Standing opposite o f cultural populism is an analytical approach which holds that,
while not totally passive, the masses o f people within a society have much less agency in
deciding what is part o f accepted culture than the populists posit. Very generally
construed, true cultural creative power lies with dominant institutions and/or classes that
are able to control or have productive access to the media and other means o f mass
communication, like the pulpit. In opposition to cultural populism’s “bottom-up”
approach, cultural pessimists’ methodology is often described as “top-down.” The
Marxist political theorist Antonio Gramsci is perhaps best known for his theory of
hegemony, which is used by many cultural pessimists to help explain how culture is
legitimized and fought over by different classes. Gramsci loosely defined what he meant
by hegemony when he wrote there is a “ ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses
of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant
fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent

2 Lawrence W. Levine, “The Folklore o f Industrial Society,” The American Historical
Review {Dec., 1992): 1380.

confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because o f its position and function in the
world o f production.”3
Cultural historian T.J. Jackson Lears argued correctly that some have
misunderstood this as being a black and white relationship. However, the validation and
imposition o f ruling class cultural norms upon society as a whole is often very ambiguous
and never total. There are always sub-cultural movements vying for substantiation against
mainstream culture. So, any good pessimist analysis o f cultural norms, validation or
controversy will acknowledge there is room for organic, grassroots agency and action.
But, it is to hold that the bulk o f cultural creation and legitimation moves in a top-down
fashion; albeit in a complex give-and-take.4
Michael Denning did well to show this complex tension between ruling class
culture and its challengers in his book about New Deal era cultural producers, The
Cultural Front: The Laboring o f American Culture in the Twentieth Century. Denning
examined groups o f cultural producers between the 1930s-1945, noting the effects (some
lasting, some not) that working-class cultural producers had on legitimizing workingclass culture in mass media. From Orson W elles’ popular front-informed themes to the
cartoons o f radical Disney animators to the witty working-man humor o f Will Rogers,
Denning revealed aspects o f how cultural hegemony had been challenged when those
from outside the upper-classes got access to cultural outlets like radio, television and the

3 Antonio Gramsci, Selections fro m the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quentin Hoare
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 12.
4 T.J. Jackson Lears, “The Concept o f Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilites,”
The American Historical Review 90.3 (1985) 567-93. Lears explores the complexities o f
Gramsci’s theories o f hegemony and their implications for cultural historians.

arts. And in so doing, Denning showed that culture, no matter whether it was mainstream
or challenging the mainstream, was validated by its producers.5
It is this kind o f top-down cultural legitimation that the national history standards
debate grants us a glimpse into. The controversy was a battle waged by conservatives in
influential positions with access to mass media. It was a battle to validate an important
definer o f American identity: our history. And it was a success as far as public perception
was concerned.

The Context

To understand how a controversy over national history standards was so quick to
become a media phenomenon and a tool for cultural manipulation by well-placed
conservatives, it is important to understand the media-hyped cultural terrain the standards
were entering into by looking at the issues involved and some analyses that have tried to
explain just why the culture wars occurred in the first place.
During the 1980s and ‘90s, there was a palpable conflict raging in America
known as the culture wars. Broadly speaking, the culture wars are commonly thought o f
as having involved general cultural issues like gender roles, race and sexuality. The
Planned Parenthood v. Casey Supreme court case o f 1992 and the direct approaches that
anti-abortion groups like Operation Rescue took by protesting abortion clinics

5 Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring o f American Culture in the
Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 1998).

reinvigorated the cultural debate over abortion. W omen’s rights and their societal role in
general were also brought to the public cultural fore.
Supreme Court cases like United States v. Virginia in 1996, which struck down
the long standing male only admissions at the Virginia Military Institute, and the 1991
confirmation hearings for Justice Clarence Thomas publicized the issue o f sexual
discrimination and harassment in American culture. Thomas was accused by former
colleague Anita Hill o f sexually harassing her and other female colleagues in the past.
The media coverage o f this woman standing up in front o f cameras and having the
courage to publicly accuse a powerful man o f harassment had a huge effect. In 1991,
before the case, 6,127 sexual harassment complaints were filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Every year afterwards that number increased, and
in 1996 it reached 15,342.6
While the issue of sexuality became a pillar o f the culture wars, it was not always
about women. A polarized national dialogue to determine the place o f homosexuality in
U.S. culture was driven by the rising HIV and AIDS epidemics; the push by gay rights
activists for the legalization o f gay marriage; Bill Clinton’s pledge to overturn the ban
against gays serving in the military which eventually led to the compromise policy of
“Don’t ask, D on’t tell;” and the horrific 1998 torture and death o f Matthew Shepard in
Laramie, Wyoming all helped open a public discussion concerning the place o f
homosexuality within culture.

6 “Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing ‘Empowered
W omen’ and Panel Member Arlen Specter Still Amazed by Reactions,” ABC World
News with Diane Sawyer, last modified October 24, 2011,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/clarence-thomas-anita-hill-supreme-court-confirmationhearing/story?id=14802217&page=2#.UUxmtBysiSo.

Race, a volatile issue at times in American history once again exploded back into
the cultural consciousness in 1992 with the Los Angeles Race Riots, sparked by the
acquittal o f four white police officers charged with assault and excessive use o f force
during the arrest o f Rodney King, a black man. The acquittals struck many black
Americans as racially influenced, as ten o f the twelve jurors were white, leading to four
days o f violence and looting, leaving fifty-three people dead. Race was sure to stay on the
cultural debate docket with court cases in the m id-‘90s like Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena and Hopwood v. University o f Texas Law School, both arguing for and against the
use o f Affirmative Action in the workplace and school, respectively.

Historiography

These cultural controversies that came to the public fore in the 1990s covered the
three biggest, most publicized issues brought up in contemporary works on the culture
debates: women’s rights, gay rights, and racial tensions. The fractures within American
culture that led to these sharp societal divisions were in the making long before the
1990s; but, it wasn’t until the publication o f James Davison Hunter’s 1991 work, Culture
Wars: The Struggle to Define America gave a name to the growing cultural partisanship
in America that journalists, politicians and public figures began to discuss the issues as
subsets o f a larger, self-conscious “culture war.” From that point on, whether the culture
wars were unique and deserving o f special epochal status or not, the media’s coverage of
these controversies as a “war” over culture reinforced the perception that it was distinct.

In his work, Hunter set the tone for the nineties by dividing the United States into
two new and growing antagonistic philosophies he dubbed “progressive” and
“orthodox.”7 Hunter noted a shift from worldviews based on ethno-centricities and
religion that tenuously co-existed (Catholics, Protestants, Jews) toward a nation in which
two hostile worldviews brought people from different faiths together, but pitted
secularists and liberal believers o f different faiths against a bloc o f conservatives
belonging to different faiths (progressive Catholics vs. pre-Vatican II Catholics,
Orthodox Jews vs. reform Jews, etc.). Hunter argued that this effect was highly polarizing
because the dividing lines involved uncompromising positions on social issues. This
polarization was squeezing and drowning out those who stood in the cultural and political
middle ground, making conciliation much harder than it had been in the past.
In the years immediately following, a number o f scholars took up the theme and
published works that attempted to explain the perceived cultural polarity. In 1992,
political commentator E.J. Dionne Jr. published Why Americans Hate Politics, in which
he blamed both major parties for the hyper-polarization o f the 1980s and 1990s by
focusing on cultural issues that many Americans remained personally undecided on,
running overtly polarized campaigns, using sound-bite political advertisements and
diversionary dramatic presidential debates.8
Four years later, sociologist Todd Gitlin published The Twilight o f Common
Dreams. The author used the Oakland textbook adoption controversy o f 1990 to make a
larger point. The specific controversy focused on a group o f predominantly African-

7 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York:
BasicBooks, 1991).
8E. J. Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

American parents, allied with a number o f former Left wing activists who accused Gary
Nash, a white, former Left wing activist (and a major player in our main drama four years
later), of having authored a racist history textbook. This issue was important because
N ash’s textbook was the only one up for adoption in the city. Oakland’s school system
eventually voted not to adopt it based on the controversy surrounding it, leaving the city
temporarily without a history textbook. Gitlin pointed out that while the controversy
became vitriolic in debates and school meetings, the larger issue o f continued slashing of
education funds by the state was never brought up for serious debate. This went directly
to his main argument that the so-called Culture Wars served as a diversion from real
economic issues that faced Americans o f all cultural identities.9
Gitlin determined that the distracting, uncompromising political and cultural
landscape o f the 1990s was caused by the ideological shifts during the 1960s and 1970s
within both liberal and conservative camps. The mainstream liberals, Gitlin argued, had
stopped focusing on common equality for all and had instead focused on affirming
distinct cultures within the United States, which had the negative effect o f highlighting
cultural differences between people and led to in-fighting among those on the Left. The
conservatives had shifted the other way. Once the party associated with entrepreneurs and
the economically privileged, the Republican Party had been slowly transformed by
neoconservatives into the party o f the common good; but this conservative conception of
public good involved pushing for individual rights over universal equality. Left in the

9 Todd Gitlin, The Twilight o f Common Dreams: Why America Is Wracked by Culture
Wars (New York: Metropolitan, 1995).

wake o f this Left wing in-fighting and evolving conservative ideology was a nation
unable to reach any sort o f broad cultural consensus.
In 2004, journalist Thomas Frank published the popular work, What's the Matter
with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart o f America, which would later be
turned into a film o f the same name. Frank focused his work on the state o f Kansas, using
it as a microcosm o f the Midwest in general. He investigated why working class voters in
this one-time bastion o f agrarian populism and stronghold o f the Democratic Party had,
by the end of the century, turned a political 180° and become a stalwart Republican base.
Frank, in the same vein as Dionne and Gitlin, proposed that the causes rested in the major
parties’ changing ideologies; except in Frank’s analyses most o f the blame lay with the
Democratic Party. Whereas many working class voters had voted for the left-wing, pro
labor economic policies o f New Deal Democrats earlier in the 20th Century, they became
alienated by the conservative economic agenda embraced by the Democratic Leadership
Council in the 1990s. Conciliation between Kansans and the Democratic Party became
even less likely as the Party’s evolving social liberalism was not shared by culturally
traditional Midwesterners. No longer able to identify with the Party o f the Left many
working class voters cast their lot with the Republican Party: a Party that was often at
odds with many working Kansans’ economic interests, but supported the traditional
social values they held in high esteem.10
While these works recognized and delved into the palpable rift in American
culture and politics, the authors offered overly simplistic explanations. Hunter’s attempt

10 Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart o f
America (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).

to divide the nation along progressive and orthodox lines was a good start at analysis, but
tried to explain a complex phenomenon while focusing mainly on ethnic and religious
affiliations. Dionne, Gitlin and Frank did well to address how changing ideological
emphases in both major parties alienated or confused many o f their supporters. But, like
Hunter before them, they painted a simple picture o f causation that is top-down, as
changes in political party agendas and thought trickle down to affect the populace at
large. On top o f that, where Hunter was able to remain largely unbiased in his is
treatment o f the “progressives” and “orthodox,” the last three authors were left-leaning
liberals who struggled to understand how the liberal consensus culture o f mid-20th
Century America, which had embodied their own political sentiments, had been shattered
and polarized in the face o f an aggressive neoconservative ascendency. Frank betrayed
his bias more than the others by going on to propose that perhaps the Democrats could
recapture the heartland with a sharp turn to the economic Left.
Neither Hunter, Dionne, nor Frank made any serious note o f the contentious
debate over history standards during the Culture Wars o f the 1990s. Hunter and Dionne
couldn’t have, as the issue o f history in schools had yet to develop when they published
their works. And perhaps Frank did not see debates over history as relevant to his
investigations into the changing political landscape o f the Midwest, though a perceived
attack on American history by liberals certainly wouldn’t have helped Democrats in that
region. For those authors, the cultural combativeness at the end o f the century was either
due to ruptures and realignments within religious communities, or the changing agendas
and ideologies o f the two major parties. In their analyses, the national history standards
debate would seem like nothing more than an outlet o f one o f the two previously

mentioned prime drivers. While Gitlin focused part o f his study on the Oakland history
textbook controversy o f 1990, in the end he saw the debates over history, and the culture
wars themselves, as a distraction from the important issues facing Americans; rather than
a powerful tool and telling symptom o f a deep cultural identity crisis.
As time passed and scholars became more detached from the events o f the
previous decade, a few historians entered the fray o f 1990s cultural analyses. The number
o f history books that touch on the topic remain sparse but there are two notable
exceptions. In 2010, historian David T. Courtwright published No Right Turn:
Conservative Politics in Liberal America. He argues that, although there has been an
undeniable conservative ascendency in American politics since Nixon’s presidency, this
swing towards the Right has not been as complete as many scholars have argued. The
author claims conservatives successfully used contentious cultural issues to divide and
conquer the New Deal coalition; but, when put in power, these same conservatives
mainly focused on effecting economic policies, not cultural ones. Courtwright’s history
analyzes the rise of the Right and the effective tool that cultural issues played in this
ascendency, painting the culture wars as an outgrowth o f conservative political strategy
more than as an actual crisis o f identity.11
The most pivotal work o f history on the culture wars to date is Daniel Rodgers’
Age o f Fracture. Published in 2010, Rodgers bookended his fractious era between the
1970s, after the postwar boom, and September 11, 2001. The author announced that it
had been a time o f reorientation o f collective identity away from the solid, common

11David T. Courtwright, No Right Turn: Conservative Politics in a Liberal America
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2010).

belief in American institutions and society, towards a new, de-centered emphasis on the
individualized experiences o f the world, loosely based around the emergence o f “the
market” as a powerful abstract idea. Rodgers looked at presidential speeches, economic
tracts and other scholarly works from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, analyzing the words
and metaphors used in order to gauge the changing public perception o f American culture
and ideology. Such a methodology forced Rodgers to look at many aspects o f life such as
the cultural, social, political and economic, and his work is an elucidating read for anyone
interested in the culture wars. But, with such a broad array o f topics to include, one
cannot be surprised that Rodgers’ focus on debates over the kind o f history taught in
classrooms consists o f only a few pages; with the 1994-95 debate over history standards
encompassing just a paragraph.12
With a number o f differing evaluations as to what the culture wars meant and
what the root causes were, it’s important that investigations into this era continue. And,
with little recent scholarship existing on the history standards controversy, it presents
itself as a pivotal topic o f study which this paper will address.
Whether the culture wars o f the 1990s were actually unique and existed as a kind
o f Kantian noumenal thing-in-itself, or if they were merely hyped phenomena o f separate
cultural issues used by political players and those in media does not matter. What does
matter is perception, and the public did and does still perceive the 1990s to be a period
that stands apart from other eras due to its intense confrontations over accepted cultural
norms, and how they should be enforced. And that perception o f heightened cultural
divide led to real political and cultural consequences in America.

12Daniel T. Rodgers, Age o f Fracture (Cambridge, MA: Belknap o f Harvard UP, 2011).

The national history standards controversy o f 1994-1996 is a great example of
top/down cultural manipulation. It was started and used by conservatives in a perceived
culturally polarized environment in order to steer public opinion in their favor and to take
control over an academic field many on the right feared was swaying too far left in its
methodology and worldview. History was and remains an important foothold in the battle
to define culture, and this battle was one definite victory for conservatives in a long,
sporadic war o f ideas.

CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY OF CONTROVERSY

In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education released a damning
report to the Undersecretary o f Education on the state o f education in the United States.
Within its 48 pages, the commission examined four categories o f the educational system:
content, expectations, time and teaching. All categories were found to be lacking.
America’s content was “a cafeteria style curriculum in which the appetizers and desserts
can easily be mistaken for the main courses.” 1 The expectations placed on students were
not high enough, as evidenced by unchallenging textbooks and decreased amounts of
homework. The commission also found that the United States spent markedly less time
on instruction than other industrialized nations. And, when it came to teachers, the
commission noted many teachers were taught too much about educational theory and not
enough about content. Finally there were shortages o f teachers for mathematics and the
sciences.2
The report warned o f a two-fold effect these perceived deficiencies could have on
American culture. “What lies behind this emerging national sense o f frustration can be
described as both a dimming o f personal expectations and the fea r o f losing a shared
vision fo r America.”3 And when defining personal ends in education, the report phrased
them clearly as economic expectations:

1 The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation A t Risk: The
Imperative fo r Educational Reform (U.S. Department o f Education, 1983), p. 17, 18.
2 The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk.
3 The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation A t Risk, p. 13.
(Emphasis added).

More and more young people emerge from high school ready
neither for college nor for work. This predicament becomes more acute
as the knowledge base continues its rapid expansion, the number of
traditional jobs shrinks, and new jobs demand greater sophistication
and preparation.4
It is clear from the start, when it came to education reform that those in positions
o f power were not concerned with improving learning for learning’s sake; but rather they
sought improved education for economic and cultural reasons. There is a debate to be had
over whether public education should be developed with economic success as the goal, or
if it should stand as important unto itself for an individual’s discovery o f self and the
world. For the purposes o f this paper though, the emphasis on history education’s role in
forming a unified vision o f America is the main concern, and reveals why the national
history standards were fodder in the 1990’s battles over the nation’s political culture. To
control the message that history education conveys to students is to control an effective
tool in the war to define the unifying themes o f America’s culture. And having control
over a nation’s unifying cultural themes is to have a powerful sway when it comes to
policy making.

The History of History

History education is no stranger to ideological battles. In his analysis o f the
secondary education in France, Emile Durkheim showed how classical education as early

as the 17th Century served the socio-political needs o f the Catholic Church.5 In the United
States, a number o f scholars and historians have shown how history education and texts
have been scrutinized and debated for their political biases over and again, often serving
or assuming underlying ideological premises.
In a 1979 article for the Harvard Educational Review, Jean Anyon investigated
seventeen recent history textbooks’ portrayal o f American history, 1865-1917. She found
almost all the textbooks referred to the first years o f the 20th Century before World War I
as “progressive,” and portrayed the trust-busting o f Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson as radical
reform o f big business. This imparted to the students that the period was full of
responsible governance keeping business in check. None o f the textbooks even
acknowledged the argument made by many historians well before 1979 that the period
spoken o f was actually conservative in the sense that anti-trust laws served merely to
maintain the power o f big business.6 In conclusion, Anyon found “school curriculum has
contributed to the formation of attitudes that make it easier for powerful groups, those
whose knowledge is legitimized by school studies, to manage and control society.”7
While Jean Anyon pointed out ways that symbolic language and underlying
assumptions in textbooks can impart ideological biases onto the student, Frances
Fitzgerald noted in her book, America Revised, how conscious external pressure on
publishers can also nudge ideology into history textbooks. She cited one example from

5 See: Emile Durkheim, The Evolution o f Educational Thought: Lectures on the
Formation and Development o f Secondary Education in France, trans. Peter Collins
(Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1977).
6 Jean Anyon, “Ideology and United States History Textbooks,” Harvard Educational
Review vol. 49 no. 3 (1979): 366-377.
7 Anyon, “Ideology and United States History Textbooks,” 382.

1961 when a right-wing group called Texans for America intimidated a textbook
adoption committee and pressed a number o f publishers to make changes in history
school books. As a result, “the Silver Burdett Company took out two passages concerning
the need for the United States to maintain friendly relations with other countries and the
possibility that some countries would occasionally disagree with us and substituted
passages saying that some countries were less free than the United States.”8 It is obvious
the ambiguous word “free” in this context was to be understood by students as “right;”
and thus, a fringe right-wing ideological belief was presented to school children,
disguised as objectivity.
From the symbolic words and assumptions textbooks include to the pressure
exerted on committees and publishers to present certain sides, it is becoming clearer how
ideology has inserted itself into history education through the 20th Century. This may or
may not be surprising. As E.H. Carr, R.G. Collingwood and others have forcefully argued
in their works discussing how history is made and written, a historian cannot separate
him or herself totally from the topic they are investigating. There is always a piece o f the
present in any history work, including textbooks, and this means that ideological
preferences are almost inevitable.9 That is not to say historians try to or do not care if
they introduce their ideological biases into their work; but, it is accepted in the field that
to do historical work is to criticize, interpret and emphasize, which all require a conscious
agent who naturally holds opinions and deep-seeded beliefs. It is this view on history
which helps explain why it is still a relevant subject for the present and useful for

8 Frances Fitzgerald, America Revised (Vintage Books: New York, 1980), 34.
9 See E.H. Carr, What is History? (Penguin: London, 1961). Also see R.G. Collingwood,
The Idea o f History (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1946).

students to learn. It also, however, reveals why history can be such a dangerous weapon
when it is presented as objective and immutable truth.
Therefore, it is not surprising to learn certain ideological biases are found in
textbooks. While ideally they are muted and kept to a minimum, sometimes they slip in.
However, when they are consciously pushed into textbooks by interest and political
groups, like in Fitzgerald’s 1961 example, educators and historians are dismayed. But,
there is an even deeper relationship between ideology and history education that dates
back to the formation o f its modem form.
In 1983, Michael Lybarger investigated the creation o f modem social studies and
published an article in the History o f Education Quarterly entitled “Origins o f the
Modem Social Studies: 1900-1916.” Lybarger, as did the originators o f social studies,
defined the subject as an amalgamation o f history, economics, political science and
civics. Lybarger in large part traced the goals o f modern social studies curriculum to the
1916 publication o f The Social Studies in Secondary Education, a report prepared by the
Committee on Social Studies. This committee was headed by Thomas Jesse Jones who
had guided the creation o f social studies at the Hampton Institute, a school for blacks.
The 1916 report borrowed many o f its ideas largely from those used at Hampton Institute,
which encouraged students to be obedient, “more patient under pressure, and more
hopeful as to the future.” 10 Jones, a supporter o f Booker T. Washington and his views,
also hoped that new students o f social studies would also imbibe a “belief in the
inevitability o f progress.” 11 These convictions, to be taught in social studies (including

10 Michael Lybarger, “Origins o f M odem Social Studies: 1900-1916,” History o f
Education Quarterly vol. 23, No. 4 (1983): 463.
11 Lybarger, “M odem Social Studies,” 462.

history), would develop an individual better suited for industrial and agricultural work. In
fact, the Committee members were convinced the new subject ought to prepare the
student for a life o f hard work. As the report was published, Lybarger noted that “James
Lynn Barnard promised the American Academy o f Social and Political Science, ‘... boys
and girls will acquire a profound respect for hard work, no matter what the trade or
profession followed, and a contempt only for laziness and inefficiency.’” 12
Lybarger contended that these three ideological assumptions: tolerance of
oppression, hope in the future and inevitability o f progress were pillars in the foundation
o f modem social studies taught in schools. If this is the case, not only is ideology present
in the textbooks America’s students have read, both as underlying assumptions and
consciously forced agendas; but, a 20th century ideology conducive to business and
liberal notions exists in the very groundwork modern social studies (history included)
springs out of.
While this has tended to be the case in most mainstream history textbooks, the
underlying support for the American system has not kept them safe from ideological
critics. In 1922, a book by Historian David Muzzey came under fire after having been a
popular textbook choice for the previous eleven years. Charles Grant Miller, a writer for
Hearst newspapers, published a piece entitled Treason to American Tradition: The Spirit
o f Benedict Arnold Reincarnated in United States History Revised in Textbooks. In his
work, Miller attacked M uzzey’s textbook, An American History as so biased that it must
be pulled from all classrooms. American history with dangerous distortions that would
negatively influence students’ notions o f America.

12 Ibid. 464.

Having been published in 1922, shortly after the Bolshevik victory in Russia and
the 1919 Red Scare in America, one might plausibly attribute this attack on history
textbooks as an expression o f anti-communism. This would be wrong. Miller was
attacking Muzzey’s pro-British distortions. Analyzing An American History’s handling of
opinions o f the Revolution, Miller noted that Muzzey gave examples o f an American
against the Revolution and a British man who was in favor o f it at the time. M iller’s
criticism? “Muzzey does not distinguish which o f the two opinions was right and which
was wrong.” 13 This omission by Muzzey, along with the omissions o f “Nathan Hale,
Anthony Wayne, Putnam, Sumter, Pickens, Marion, Stark, Sullivan, and Knox” 14 and
others, is evidence in the eyes o f Miller o f the author’s unpatriotic pro-British bent. This
tactic o f criticizing a textbook’s omissions would arise again in the 1990s history
standards debate.
As the 20th century progressed, instances o f history textbooks being criticized or
censored for including anti-American ideology continued. Famous Historian Harold
Rugg was attacked by the National Republic in 1936 for “Sovietizing our children” with
his history books.15 In 1940, National Association o f Manufacturers’ president H.W.
Prentis Jr. proclaimed “our free institutions and the heroes o f the American republic have
been derided and debunked by a host o f puny iconoclasts, who destroy since they cannot
build,” he then sent out 6,830 “sentinels” across the nation to sniff out unpatriotic history

13 Charles Grant Miller, Treason to American Tradition: The Spirit o f Benedict Arnold
Reincarnated in United States History Revised in Textbooks (Sons o f the Revolution in
the State o f California, 1922), 13.
14 Ibid.
15 Dan W. Gilbert, “Sovietizing Our Children,” National Republic, August 24, 1936, 16.

books.16 Censorship o f educators in the name o f education became so intense in the
1950s that “more than half the states required teachers to sign loyalty oaths;” and books
like Progressive Education is REDucation often portrayed interpretations by historians
like George Counts, Charles Beard and Harold Rugg as unpatriotic, if not pro
communist.17
As more and more instances o f controversy surrounding history textbooks arose,
the more cautious publishing houses chose not to offend any textbook audiences and their
parents. This helped the emerging dominance o f consensus theory history in academia
and school history textbooks throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Consensus historians’
underlying philosophy was that in the history o f America there was never any real
ideological conflict. They held that, despite there being radicals on the fringe o f its
politics, America had continually progressed along a classic liberal trajectory. A wellknown example o f consensus history is Louis Hartz’s 1955 work, The Liberal Tradition
in America. In it, Hartz proposed that there is lack o f divisive ideologies in the United
States. This is partly due to the lack o f a feudal past in America, which has spared its
political development any conflict with an internal conservative establishment, and has
allowed a Lockean liberalism to hold firm in the political minds o f its inhabitants,
uninterrupted from the Revolution right through to his present tim e.18
As social histories about Black Americans, women and the working classes were
starting to pop up in the universities during the 1950s, the introduction o f social history

16 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History On Trial, 44.
17 Ibid, 68.
18 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (Harcourt, Brace: New York, 1955).
Other Examples o f Consensus historians are Richard Hofstadter, The American Political
Tradition (1948); Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius o f American Politics (1953); and David
Potter, People o f Plenty (1954).

into school textbooks came at a slow trickle due to publishing companies reticence at
adding anything that might catch the eye o f civic clubs like the John Birch Society, the
American Legion or the Daughters o f the American Revolution.
Then the turbulent 1960s reared its head. The civil rights movement encouraged
the NAACP in 1962 to successfully request that the Detroit city school system remove a
history textbook published by the Laidlaw Brothers, because it contained racial prejudice.
This victory encouraged other organizations concerned with racial issues to start
investigating textbooks for racism. The B’nai Brith’s Anti-Defamation League and the
Council on Interracial Books analyzed texts to make sure they treated minorities with
fairness.19
By the 1970s, both race and gender started to appear more often in history
textbooks. Publishers even developed certain guidelines to follow so as to avoid
appearing racist or sexist in their texts. “The Holt, Rinehart & Winston guidelines on
gender, for instance,” wrote historian Frances Fitzgerald in 1980, “include such strictures
as ‘Avoid ‘the founding fathers,’ use ‘the founders.’ [...] To avoid ethnic stereotyping, its
guidelines warn against the overuse o f names like ‘M ary’ and ‘John’ and the use of only
one ethnic name in lists o f arbitrarily chosen names.”20

The Push for Standards

With these brief examples, it is clear how ideology has constantly influenced
history education; and it is easy to understand how the national history standards would

19 Frances Fitzgerald, America Revised (Vintage Books, New York: 1980), 38-39.
20 Fitzgerald, America Revised, 41.

become an ideological controversy in 1994. Starting after the release o f A Nation at Risk,
a push for standards-based education reform became a hot issue for both the George
H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. In 1989, the administration o f George H.W.
Bush teamed up with the National Governors’ Association to develop six National
Education Goals, which Bush announced in his 1990 State o f the Union Address. Goal
three proposed that “American students will leave grades four, eight, and twelve having
demonstrated competency in challenging subject matter including English, mathematics,
science, history, and geography.”21 These goals were uncontroversial enough to pass and
became known as America 2000, setting into motion the production process o f the
national history standards.
Two years later in 1992, congress followed suit and supported the development of
national standards for five core disciplines, including history. These standards were to be
voluntary for schools and national in development, instead o f mandatory and federal,
respectively. Funding was to come from private and public means, in an attempt to stave
off any possible controversy over there being too much government control o f education.
Because it funded almost half o f the project, the National Endowment for the Humanities
(NEH) oversaw the history standards project and awarded the bulk o f its development to
the National Center for History in the Schools (NCHS), a cooperative research program
at UCLA. Directors o f the NCHS, Charlotte Crabtree and Gary Nash, put together a
number o f councils and panels featuring a wide variety o f participants. Involved in the
national history standards project were presidents o f history organizations, county and

21 U.S. Department of Education, National Goals fo r Education (U.S. Department of
Education, 1990), 1.

city school district staff, teachers, history scholars, as well as representatives o f twentyfour education and public interest associations.22
This wide inclusion o f representatives from differing worldviews (from the
National Catholic Educational Association to the Native American Heritage Commission
to the National Alliance o f Black School Educators) was intentional and not surprising,
considering the tide o f multiculturalism that had become a contentious cultural view o f
America during the 1990s. Nash and Crabtree, two leaders o f the project, agreed that
individuals involved in the shaping o f the standards “should represent a wide range of
interests and perspectives among scholars, teachers, and advocates o f history education.
[...] The composition o f the council was crucial,” they wrote, “ .. .a look around the table
at the first meeting o f the forum revealed a microcosm o f America itself.”23 They went on
to mention their inclusion o f representatives o f Catholics, Native Americans, Lutherans,
Asian and Pacific Americans, and African Americans. They included “Academic
historians as well as teachers, women as well as men, and people o f differing views on
the history wars under way since the 1980s.” As many invested in history education saw
it at the time there was finally a chance to rewrite on a massive scale the story o f America
taught to millions o f school children. Nash and Crabtree noted, “those who were at first
reluctant about the wisdom o f this enterprise soon decided that they might compromise
their own best interests if they failed to join in.”24 It is in this intentional establishment of
multicultural panels that one can find the impact the concurrent culture wars had on the
development o f the standards.

22 Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree, Ross E. Dunn, History on Trial (Knopf: New York,
1998), 159.
23 Nash, Crabtree, Dun, History on Trial, 159.
24 Ibid., 158.

Cultural Context and Its Effect

As discussed in the last chapter, the nation was going through a self-perceived
culture war during this time. The works mentioned before about the culture wars and
others were written to figure out what this “war” really entailed, and whether it was
started as purely a cultural debate or was instigated by politics masquerading as culture.
Either way, the issues labeled as culture war issues had a real impact on how Americans
thought about themselves, their communities and country. In the same way that historians
o f the 19th and mid-20th centuries had betrayed biases and opinions o f their time in their
work, so too did the authors o f the standards have to deal with issues o f the culture wars
while creating a new vision for history in schools. Certain hot-button issues at the time
that ideally would have nothing to do with creating history curriculums expressed
themselves and exerted certain pressures that the formative committees could not but help
to address. In this way, history is never free from the present it is written in.
Understanding how a given political cultural climate can influence the process of
developing a history curriculum will help elucidate the movement through which political
culture can be changed. The efforts by conservatives to use the history standards as a
punching bag were motivated in part by a desire to gain a cultural victory over
proponents o f an ideology they did not like, and which had crept into the standards:
multiculturalism. Almost immediately after Cheney started the conservatives’ attacks,
they were met by a backlash by the standards’ supporters and champions o f
multiculturalism, opening up a media space in which the past and present o f American

culture was to be fought over in a way as to grab the public’s attention and manipulate
their cultural heart strings. But even before the attacks flew, and before the standards
were close to being finished, multiculturalism had been an issue grappled by those on the
standards’ committees, because it was a hot-button issue in America as a whole at the
time.
In purposely teaming the councils involved in developing the standards with
representatives o f different cultural worldviews, Gary Nash and Charlotte Crabtree were
influenced by multiculturalism. There are two usages o f the word multiculturalism. The
first use is descriptive, and denotes a single community or nation with cultural diversity
among its residents. This was broadly accepted by most as a fact in America by the
1990s. This view does not lend opinion to the question o f whether cultural diversity is
good or bad, healthy or symptomatic o f a problem; it merely states a demographic
phenomenon.
The second use o f the term “multiculturalism” is more standard-bearing, and
represents an ideology that believes cultural diversity is a good thing, and healthy for a
nation. It is this second use, that o f multiculturalism as an ideology, that was fought over
and debated during the culture wars. And it is this ideology that was inherently supported
by Crabtree and Nash when they intentionally built the standards project’s councils with
representatives o f different cultural worldviews. That is one way the culture wars affected
the standards: in the very make-up o f those people involved in their development.
That is not where the influence stopped. The battle over multiculturalism in
education was a major conflict in the culture wars at the end o f the last century. In 1991
Hunter wrote how debates over multicultural curriculum in schools should be construed

as culture war, citing controversies at Stanford, University o f Wisconsin, Columbia and
other campuses over required ethnic studies courses.25 Some conservatives had been
weary o f school curriculum as a bastion o f liberal bias as early as 1971, when Associate
Justice o f the Supreme Court, Lewis F. Powell warned conservative colleagues in a
confidential memorandum about assaults on the American free enterprise system,
including liberal academics on campuses. Powell asserted that “members o f the
intellectual community are waging ideological warfare against the enterprise system and
the values o f western society.”26 He specifically claimed that “Social science faculties
(the political scientist, economist, sociologist and many o f the historians) tend to be
liberally oriented.”27 He worried about the effects these liberal educators would have on
the youths’ minds. Powell’s answer to this problem was to wage a war o f the minds. He
encouraged the Chamber o f Commerce to establish a staff o f scholars who believe in
traditional American values and economics, as well as to evaluate textbooks for antiAmerican system bias. Powell went on to propose the establishment o f conservative, profree enterprise think tanks to help with the ideological war America was gripped in.28
With such intense worry and attention by conservatives about ideological bias in
education since the 1970s, and with the advent o f the divide over multiculturalism in
school curriculums in the 1980s, it is no surprise that it would arise as a major debate

25 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York:
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during the forums to decide what kind o f histories should be included in the standards
between 1992 and 1994.
In April 1992, at the very first meeting o f the National Council for History
Standards, multiculturalism became a sticking point. So apparent was the rift that
Education Week, a weekly newspaper devoted to the field o f education, ran an article
entitled “Issue o f Multiculturalism Dominates Standards Debate.”29 Council members
such as Mabel Lake Murray, Cynthia Neverdon-Morton and Sam Banks argued that a
multicultural perspective was necessary if the council was going to develop standards that
presented accurate history that included more than just a white perspective.30 A small
conservative bloc, consisting partially o f Mark Curtis o f the Atlantic Council o f the
United States and Chester Finn, professor o f education and public policy, stated their fear
that such a multicultural education might “threaten to balkanize American society,”
because it would “serve to drive people apart and will diminish the critical importance of
teaching about our common American heritage.”31
The United States history standards’ development was not the only one to be
racked by multicultural division. The council striving to create world history standards
also found itself faced with a deep split over the perspective schools should take and the
goals they should have in teaching history that supposedly covered the whole world. One
side o f the argument was made up o f traditionalists like Lynne Cheney, William Bennett,
and Allan Bloom. They argued that the proposed world history standards should take a
markedly pro-Western focus, educating students on the roots and development of

29 Debra Viadero, “Issue o f Multiculturalism Dominates Standards Debate,” Education
Week, April 22, 1992, 18.
30 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 160, 161.

Western thought and traditions from ancient Greece through Rome, Europe, and up to
America’s shores. This view intertwined with an anti-multicultural point o f view in the
sense that it conceptualized American history and culture as having a unified theme that
could be historically traced back to Europe. It is also centered on perceived notions of
Western traditions and did not acknowledge the traditions o f non-Western cultures.32
Other scholars, like William McNeill, representatives o f the American Historical
Association, Marilyn Jo Hitchens o f the World History Association and Nguyen Minh
Chau o f the National Association for Asian and Pacific American Education all disagreed
with the idea o f Western-centered standards for world history. Unfortunately for them,
they had trouble agreeing amongst themselves how a non-western centered set of
standards would be organized; but it is clear in Nash and Crabtree’s account that these
individuals wished for a world history that sanctioned a multicultural perspective,
acknowledging not just western traditions, but many others including African and
Asian.33 This led to months o f debate and wrangling amongst members o f the council on
world history.
Both issues o f whether the US standards should emphasize the diversity of
cultural perspectives in America’s past and whether the world history standards should
emphasize western culture or not can be traced back to the contentious cultural debates o f
the 1980s and 1990s. With the debate o f multiculturalism still raging in society at large, it
was doomed to come up in discussions that would impact how children are taught our
nation’s past.

32 Ibid., 165.
33 Ibid., 167-169.

Unlike the American public, it took just a little over a month for the authors o f the
United States history standards to find a compromise on the issue o f multiculturalism. In
May o f 1992, the authors agreed on two criteria. One, that the “history o f any society can
only be understood by studying all its constituent parts. [...] Standards for United States
history should reflect the nation’s diversity,” an obvious nod to proponents o f a
multicultural perspective. However, to appease those who wished to see a unified
American cultural tradition taught in schools, the authors included that “Standards in
United States history should contribute to citizenship education through developing
understanding o f our common civic identity and shared civic values within the polity.”34
Those educators and historians involved in creating the world history standards
were not so fortunate. The debate over taking a Western-oriented approach or taking an
approach that emphasized the multitude o f national and cultural histories from around the
world lasted from April o f 1992 until it was finally and uneasily resolved in June o f 1993.
It was then that the council adopted the much mediated and edited compromise dubbed
Criterion 13, which stated “Standards in world history should treat the history and values
o f diverse civilizations, including those o f the West, and should especially address the
interactions among them.”35
After the debates over how far a multicultural perspective would be permitted in
both the United States and world history standards, Nash, Crabtree, and most others
involved in their development thought the issue was finally overcome. Little could they
have known that just a year and a half later, after the conservatives in Congress became

34 Joint meeting o f the National Council for History Standards and the National Forum
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emboldened with significant gains in both House and Senate seats, this issue would come
back to haunt them. Attacking conservatives took issue mainly with the amount of
multiculturalism perceived to be in the standards. And it was this issue which would
ultimately bring the history standards to their knees, and afford conservative cultural
warriors a valuable victory in early 1995.
The historians discussed earlier in this chapter - Muzzey, Rugg, Beard, the
consensus historians o f the 1950s; all were just as affected by their contemporary cultural
situations as those who suddenly faced debates over multiculturalism in historical
perspective during the developmental processes o f 1992-1994. Some, like the consensus
historian Hartz, found popularity when their works coincided with mainstream cultural
thought. Others, like Muzzey and Rugg, were criticized for taking unpopular perspectives
that ran up against popular notions o f Americanism and tradition.
So too were the creators and supporters o f the national history standards attacked by
those defending what they saw as true American traditions and values.
This is the inescapable nature o f history when it enters the public arena. Those
who write it are not only influenced by their own current cultural surroundings and
assumptions on society as they research and write; but then once again they risk criticism
and attack by those who hold opposing cultural assumptions after they are published.
This is one attribute that allows for lively debate in the field and keeps history fresh.
However, it is also what allows vested political and cultural institutions to use history as a
weapon o f cultural manipulation by interested political and cultural institutions. This is
just what happened in October o f 1994, as we turn our attention to the substance o f the
attacks.

CHAPTER THREE
THE ATTACKS

On May 19, 1994, the National Council that oversaw the creation process o f the
history standards met for the last time in order to finalize the world and United States
standards and send them off for publication. According to Ross Dunn and Gary Nash,
two editors o f the standards who were present, almost everyone at the meeting supported
this fifth re-edit o f standards, except Chester Finn.1 Finn had served as Assistant U.S.
Secretary o f Education between 1985 and 1988 under the Reagan Administration, and
had been a critic o f the multicultural perspective in history throughout the development
process. He worried that “political correctness and relativism rears its head in too many
places,” and that the “usual manifestations o f excessive attention to fashionable groups
and obscure individuals who need to be there for proportional purposes,” took away from
accurate, proper history education.2
No one other than Finn objected to the U.S. standards though; it was the world
history standards that faced a larger challenge. Those who had advocated for a westerncentered perspective from the beginning o f the project once again pushed for a total
revision o f the world standards. Everyone agreed that both sets o f standards would be
published, with the understanding that they would encourage healthy debate amongst

1Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 180-181.
2 Chester E. Finn Jr,. “Notes for National Forum/National Council History Standards
Discussion,” Washington, D.C., Education Policy Committee o f the Educational
Excellence Network, May 19, 1994. As quoted in History on Trial, 180.

educators and possibly the public.3 Council members were not prepared for the kind of
politically motivated debate that was waiting for them, however.
On October 20, 1994, the Wall Street Journal printed an op-ed piece by Lynne
Cheney, former NEH chairwoman who approved the grant o f $525,000 the NEH awarded
the NCHS to create the standards. In her essay, Cheney juxtaposed what she called
“celebratory prose” for historical topics such as Mansa Musa and Africa to the critical
emphases the documents showed for Americans like John D. Rockefeller and Joseph
McCarthy.4 She counted 19 references to McCarthy or McCarthyism and 17 references to
the Ku Klux Klan, and contrasted that to six references to Harriet Tubman, one reference
to Ulysses S. Grant, and none to Robert E. Lee.5
Cheney argued these were glaring examples o f how liberal multiculturalists had
hijacked the history standards and were trying to push an unpatriotic, left-wing revision
o f history onto students. The “ 1992 presidential election unleashed the forces o f political
correctness. [...] those who were ‘pursuing the revisionist agenda’ no longer bothered to
conceal their ‘great hatred for traditional history.’”6 She left the reader with an ominous
prediction if nothing was done, “there is every reason to believe that the certification
process put in place by the Clinton administration will lead to the adoption o f the
proposed standards more or less intact —as official knowledge —with the result that
much that is significant in our past will begin to disappear from our schools.”7
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If these standards were grossly biased and unfair in their treatment o f American
history, what did Cheney prescribe as proper historical curriculum? She referenced an
earlier document published by the same center she was now criticizing, “Lessons From
History,” released by the NCHS. Cheney claimed that the “Lessons” publication
“conveys the notion that wealth sometimes has had positive cultural consequences in this
country. [...] ‘Lessons’ is honest about the failings o f the U.S., but it also regularly
manages a tone o f affirmation.”8 For Cheney, it appeared the problem with the standards
was not that it was biased in general, but that it was biased in the wrong direction.
Cheney believed the history taught in schools should be patriotic and affirm that wealthy
individuals are more helpful than hurtful, and individual initiative is a vital part o f
American identity. Good history “emphasized the individual greatness that has flourished
within our political system and in our representative institutions.”9
In her argument for a glorified version o f American history that put wealthy
historical actors in a good light and would pay scant attention to racial and class conflicts,
Cheney was really arguing for a culture that did the same. Her article was a way to
portray liberals and Democrats as supporters o f multiculturalism, and for Cheney and
many other conservatives this was a dangerous cultural ideology. It threatened the
conception o f America as being unified by republican values and mono-cultural, and so it
had to be stopped. With the 1994 midterm elections rapidly approaching, the newly
published history standards presented an opportunity for conservatives to try and
convince the public that multiculturalism, and the liberals who supported it, were

8 Cheney, “The End o f History.”
9 Ibid.

attacking the real American way o f life; and thus, by de facto, the conservatives were
defending it.
Cheney made the standards sound threatening and politically motivated by
overlooking or omitting certain things. For example, eight o f the seventeen references to
the Ku Klux Klan that Cheney counted were not in the standards themselves, but were
actually included in one teaching activity. Eight others were also from teaching activities
mentioned for different grades. Only one reference to the KKK was ever included in the
actual standards.10 Cheney’s maneuver is known in debates and logic class as semantic
ambiguity, and it rests on the interpretation o f individual words. In this case, Mrs. Cheney
claimed the Ku Klux Klan and Senator McCarthy were mentioned suspiciously more
often in the “standards” than traditional historical role models like Harriet Tubman and
Robert E. Lee. But as noted above, her analysis didn’t differentiate between the teaching
activities, a list o f suggested questions and projects that accompanied the standards, and
the actual standards. This ambiguity afforded Cheney the opportunity to make it appear to
the reader as though the history standards were filled with pessimistic interpretations of
America’s past, omitting the historical heroes many Americans had grown to love.
Semantic ambiguity aside, Cheney did not offer up any context surrounding how
the words were used, or what historical issues the questions or statements that included
those words addressed. She added numbers to loaded historical names and words, which
gave a fa 9ade o f well done research, when really it was wrought with glaring ambiguities.
Cheney’s op-ed traced the roots o f the problematic standards to the 1992 election
o f President Clinton, which allegedly emboldened advocates o f multiculturalism to push
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their ideological views into the history standards. Cheney quoted an unnamed insider
who stated “Those who were ‘pursuing the revisionist agenda’ no longer bothered to
conceal their ‘great hatred for traditional history.’” 11 Her insinuation was that behind this
offensive cultural assault was the liberal establishment. She did not mention President
Bush’s creation o f America 2000, partly funding the creation o f education standards in
1991; or, how the NEH under her leadership initially funded the National Center for
History in the Schools at UCLA in 1988, the program that would organize the standards’
development.12 These omissions revealed Lynne Cheney’s political intentions, making
liberals the villains of her article and deflecting her and the Republicans’ role. By
claiming the conflict was started by power drunk liberal interests, she appeared as a
defender o f an American artifact under attack; rather than a political partisan using
history to promote conservative values ahead o f a midterm election.
A month earlier on September 27, 300 Republican candidates met on the steps of
the Capitol and revealed the “Contract with America,” a document listing ten political
promises signatories were making to the nation if voters granted them more power.
Promises o f a mandatory balanced budget, a required 3/5 vote by Congress to raise taxes,
a tax credit for parents and a reduction for married couples, lower capital gains tax rates,
and other economically conservative reforms. The Contract noticeably avoided cultural
issues. David Rosenbaum remarked the televised rally “had the flavor o f a political
convention. A band o f retired military musicians played Sousa marches and college fight

11 Cheney, “The End o f History,” http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~mlassite/discussions261/cheney.html.
12 Nash, Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 113.

songs.” 13 The ceremony was followed the next night with a fund raiser for Republican
candidates, and the organized Republican strategy to retake the House hit the ground
running.
Three weeks after the unveiling o f Republicans’ Contract with America, and two
weeks before the mid-terms, Cheney’s op-ed was published in the Wall Street Journal
and opened the cultural front the Republicans had left out o f their Contract. The history
standards provided an opportunity to portray liberal Democrats as cultural provocateurs
who threatened to change the nation’s very identity, while keeping conservatives’ hands
clean o f any cultural haranguing. The timing was perfect. With the elections just weeks
away, and the conservatives poised to take the House o f Representatives, conservatives
were eager to attack liberals wherever they could.
It is hard to imagine that Cheney, former president o f the NEH, member of
Lockheed Corporation’s Board o f Directors, and future senior fellow at American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, would knowingly allow an essay with
such blatant misleading information to be published if her purpose was to offer it as
honest analysis. However, using mass media to make a dubious argument has been a
technique for swaying public sentiments. It has even been employed by government
produced propaganda during times o f war and need. Creating red herrings and straw men,
using circular reasoning or ad hominem attacks, all are time tested techniques to attack
opponents or make suspicious arguments. Misleading language has been used by
politicians in order to gain support or dodge liability; to control a conversation or sway

13 David E. Rosenbaum, “Republicans Offer Voters Deal for Takeover o f House,” New
York Times, September 28, 1994, A 16.

opinion. In firing the first shot across the bow, Lynne Cheney was declaring a political
war, not a scholarly one.

The Attacks Spread

Between the end o f October, 1994 and February, 1995, TV news, news radio, and
op-eds blew up with arguments for and against the proposed history standards. Even after
the Senate denunciation in January, the standards would make intermittent appearances as
they were revised and rereleased in 1996. Shortly following Cheney’s op-ed in late
October, conservative personalities took up arms against the proposed standards for U.S.
and world history.
The attacks on the history standards spread to conservative Rush Limbaugh’s
popular radio show four days after Cheney’s piece was published, and onto his television
show four days after that. He lambasted the standards, saying they should be discarded
“down the sewer o f multiculturalism.” 14 Between Rush Limbaugh’s radio and TV
attacks, the Associated Press picked up on the buzz and featured an article in the New
York Times on October 26 entitled, “Plan to Teach U.S. History is Said to Slight White
Males.” The article presented the views o f both critics and supporters o f the standards,
and represented the controversy as objective and newsworthy. The strategic importance
o f the article lies in the fact that it was presented as descriptive news, not an opinion

14 Transcript from Rush Limbaugh radio program, October 24, 1994, as quoted in History
on Trial, Nash, Crabtree and Dunn, 5.

piece. This shows that the conservative critics’ politically motivated complaints were
working in driving the controversy into a mainstream, legitimate debate.15
The conservative commentators hit the presses running. On November 4th, the day
o f the midterm elections, Charles Krauthammer had an article printed in The Washington
Post titled, “History Hijacked,” in which he claimed that the standards were bom out of
good intentions by the Bush administration, but had been “hijacked by the educational
establishment and turned into a classic o f political correctness.” 16 Krauthammer was
using the same boogeyman that conservatives had been lambasting since the Powell
Memorandum o f 1971, when Lewis Powell wrote the Education Committee o f the U.S.
Chamber o f Commerce to warn o f a growing left-wing influence in American education.
“The whole document strains,” he continued, “to promote the achievements and highlight
the victimization o f the country’s preferred minorities, while straining equally to degrade
the achievements and highlight the flaws o f the white males who ran the country.” 17
Krauthammer, like Cheney and Limbaugh before him, drove home the same point:
liberals and multiculturalists were trying to destroy America’s history by including new
races and by not focusing as much on the traditional white heroes the adults o f 1994 had
grown up learning about.
Other conservative commentators made sure to chime in. John D. Fonte, future
fellow at the conservative AEI and Hudson Institute, published a critical article entitled,
“Rewriting History,” in the San Diego Union-Tribune on November 6th. Kim Weissman

15Associated Press, “Plan to Teach U.S. History is Said to Slight White Males,” New
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16 Charles Krauthammer, “History Hijacked,” The Washington Post, November 4, 1994,
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17 Krauthammer, “History Hijacked,” The Washington Post, as quoted in History on Trial
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and J.D. Dampman sent Letters to the Editor, published on November 8 in the Wall Street
Journal. And conservative columnist John Leo devoted his column in U.S. News &
World Report to criticizing the standards in an article titled, “The Hijacking o f American
History” on November 14.18
Four days after the Republicans took a majority in the House o f Representatives
in the midterm elections, the Wall Street Journal published a fiery op-ed written by
Balint Vazsonyi, renowned pianist and senior fellow at the little known Potomac
Foundation, a conservative think tank. Titled, “History Thieves,” Vazsonyi mercilessly
attacked the standards in a flamboyantly unfair fashion. Only citing Cheney’s article and
her stated opinion o f the standards, not the standards themselves, he decried them as
being a product o f the same process pioneered by the Nazis and Bolsheviks in their
attempt to brainwash populaces. “The recipe called for schools which dispense not
knowledge, but a compendium o f selected events, personalities and interpretations. [...]
Because it has worked every time, it is this same recipe ‘National Standards’ seeks to
dispense to America.” 19 Balint went on to paint a picture o f these standards as being the
latest in a continued struggle by those who want to control the world and destroy Western
civilization. The goal o f these horrible agents is to
deprive American consciousness o f its solid foundations and remove
forever the intractable impediments standing in the way o f those who dream o f a
closed, regimented, controlled world. By divorcing the fruits o f Western
civilization and o f Anglo-American pragmatism from their roots, from the
personalities and events which brought them forth, there will be no more need for
battlefield victories.20
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By lumping Nazis, Communists and the National History Standards together,
Balint indubitably attempted to make the reader equate the standards with other notable
“evils” from history. It is an informal fallacy known in logic as a hasty generalization. He
stated his assertion that these villains’ aim was to destroy the roots o f the American
identity as though it were fact, without presenting any evidence.
At no point in his tirade did Balint quote any part o f the standards. His article is
fanciful and aimed to paint a picture o f an impending monster created to gobble up
American history. As with Mrs. Cheney’s article, his short essay is not meant to
elucidate, but rather to incite.
Three days after Balint’s opinion essay was published, the world standards were
released. The New York Times announced their release while acknowledging the
growing divisiveness around them. “The historians who wrote the standards are well
aware that their work may offer yet another opportunity for the culture wars to enter the
high school arena, just as their American history standards did when released last
month.”21 The author went on to note the political effect this controversy was having.
This week Under Secretary o f Education Marshall S. Smith, former dean
o f the School o f Education at Stanford University, rejected Mrs. Cheney’s
contention that the Clinton Administration would adopt the proposed standards as
matters o f official knowledge. “W e’re really trying to keep hands off,” he said,
stressing that any national standards would be voluntary.22
Thomas’s article revealed more between the lines than just a hesitant Clinton
administration. It revealed Cheney’s motives when it states that she had earlier
contended, after her initial attack, that Clinton’s administration would adopt the standards
as “official knowledge.” She intended to paint the Democrats as the villains behind the
21 Jo Thomas, “A New Guideline on History Looks Beyond Old Europe,” The New York
Times, November 11, 1994, A22.
22 Ibid.

culturally explosive standards, tying them directly to the standards when it had actually
been bipartisan in origin. And the effectiveness o f the conservatives’ public attacks is
shown in Mr. Smith’s insistence that the Democratic administration would not
automatically adopt the standards, and stressed that they would be voluntary. Already by
November 11, just three weeks after the initial attack in the Wall Street Journal, the
standards’ were being considered a hot potato by the President’s administration.
The lack o f any insistence at the time that the attacks made on the standards by
conservatives might be motivated by their newfound political power and their
emboldened new leadership is striking. A reason for this could be how unexpected all this
criticism was by the supporters. Another is that, while conservatives were using the
standards to influence the cultural debate in the U.S., their counterparts on the left had
had no such intentions. This is bore out in research on the standards debate.
In 1999, the journal Social Education published the results o f a study performed
by researchers Patricia Avery and Theresa Johnson. The two authors investigated ten
newspapers to determine which interests were represented the most during the history
standards debate. Out o f thirty-seven non-editorial articles, conservative spokespersons
and groups represented 17% o f quoted sources (the rest were either educators or
government officials). While 17% may not seem high, it is important to note that the
percent o f liberal organizations or spokespersons quoted was zero. “Their strong presence
is interesting in itself,” the researchers noted, “but it is particularly noteworthy in the
absence o f any balance from parallel liberal voices.”23 The absence o f anything
resembling a coherent defense from liberal groups, and the prevalence o f a large public

23 Patricia G. Avery and Theresa Johnson, “How Newspapers Framed the U.S. History
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conservative presence surrounding the issue, serve as more evidence that the debate was
intended as a surprise attack by a number o f conservatives to manipulate sensitive
cultural issues at the time.

The Big Blow

On January 18, 1995, after much public debate over the history standards and
whether they portrayed a distorted view o f American history, the Senate voted 99-1,
without having held a single hearing on the matter, in favor o f a legally non-binding
resolution repudiating the standards. The resolution requested that any future history
education guidelines “not be based on standards developed primarily by the NCHS prior
to February 1, 1995.”24 It went on to say that any future guidelines that use government
funds, “the recipient o f such funds should have a decent respect for U.S. history’s roots in
Western civilization.”25
The lopsided vote had the appearance o f bipartisan agreement. But in reality, the
resolution was a rider amendment to a mandated budget bill, and was thrown in last
minute. Many Democratic congressmen did not want to vote for it, but only upon the
compromise to make it legally non-binding (in the hopes that it would not affect the
standards), and to hurry the vote for the budget bill, they agreed to pass it.26
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Two weeks later, this provision along with others that had been strapped to the
Unfunded Mandates Bill were stripped, and thus the resolution condemning the standards
was undone, but the damage wasn’t. The public had witnessed the debate unfold in
newspapers and on television. Conservative critics had won the image war; they had
shown that manipulating a perceived threat to a conservative conception o f American
values and culture could stoke enough anger and stir up national attention. Riding the
wave o f political success after their November victories, they now found a quick cultural
success in the publicized defeat o f the national history standards.
The campaign against the standards was so successful that the Clinton
Administration shied away from supporting them. The attacks on the standards had been
so useful for effecting the cultural climate that eight months after the Senate vote, while
an independent commission was busy reviewing and reworking the standards, the
Secretary o f Education Richard Riley still insisted that “The President and I do not think
the history standards are the basis for a good curriculum in the schools.”27 This was quite
a turnaround from the Administration’s full support o f the standards through November
o f 1994. It is clear the public controversy driven by conservative pundits had had its
intended effect: garnering a cultural victory to buffer political power and weakening the
image o f their liberal opponents by defeating a landmark attempt at education reform.
As an independent committee approved by the Council for Basic Education
scrambled to edit the standards through the spring o f 1995, the debate trickled on in the
news media. After the January vote, those who had supported the standards, mostly
educators and people involved in their development, wrote a number o f op-eds in an

27 Department o f Education Press Release, September 4, 1995, as quoted in Nash,
Crabtree, Dunn, History on Trial, 246.

attempt to fix the tarnished image o f their history standards. While a good number o f opeds and letters to the editors were published after January, there is now little doubt that
the conservative attackers had done much o f what they had come to do. By February of
1995, the standards had been maligned, exaggerated, taken out o f context and used as a
multicultural boogeyman so effectively by some on the Right, that the hopes the creators
o f the standards had had that the standards would radically change history education in
America were dashed. The power o f cultural manipulation through mass media, as shown
by a good handful o f conservative commentators, had been too powerful for the unwitting
educators who had worked two years to develop a comprehensive set o f standards to be
used to improve children’s grasp o f their nation’s past.

CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION

Over thirty organizations had taken part in the development o f the national history
standards. As they were published in late 1994, twenty-nine o f them officially supported the
finished product. The outlier was the American Federation o f Teachers (AFT), a labor union
which was at this time under the conservative leadership o f controversial education activist
A1 Shanker. The AFT took up issue with the world history standards, believing them
deficient on recent and European history, as well as arguing they paid little attention to the
achievements o f the W est.1 So, when it came time to think about re-editing both standards
after the Senate censure in January 1995, AFT representative Ruth Wattenberg had an idea.
A day after the censure she wrote the director o f educational programs at the Pew Charitable
Trusts, suggesting that perhaps individuals who had not been a part o f the original standards
development should be given a chance at their revision. Specifically, she suggested these
individuals should be “centrist and conservative historians.”2
In the aftermath o f the Senate resolution, this was a conscious request to effectively
hand historical narrative and in part the shaping o f American identity over to a specific side
o f the political spectrum, with the aim o f disseminating it to public schools nationwide.
Robert Schwartz, the director Wattenberg wrote, disagreed. A review and possible revision
of the national set o f history standards was instead awarded to the Council for Basic
Education (CBE), a non-profit organization with both liberal and conservative membership,

1 History on Trial, 185.
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whose main objective was to push for liberal arts education in schools. From June to October
o f 1995, the CBE worked closely with the NCHS to determine ways in which the standards
could be improved and made less contentious. While damage had been done to the public
reputation o f the standards after they were censured and practically abandoned by the Clinton
administration, at least its original developers could breathe a sigh o f relief that they, and not
centrist and conservative historians alone, would have a say in the second finished product.
The Senate censure (and its much less noted removal) did not quiet the debate over
the standards. It did, however, garner less public attention. The New York Times opinion
pages serve as a window into the debate as well as evidence that there was a concerted
attempt by a group to consciously steer the public conversation. O f the sixteen articles
concerning the history standards (fourteen opinion pieces, two objective) printed in the New
York Times alone between 1994 and 1997, nine o f them were printed in a three month span
between the January censure and April, 1995. In this span there was a coordinated effort by
members o f the American Enterprise Institute’s Committee to Review National Standards to
further attack the voluntary standards, and criticize any support for them expressed in the
paper.
The increased back-and-forth over the national history standards now received less
consideration by the public at large. The initial jabs conservatives had thrown at the
standards had done their job. Now, as the scholarly debate ramped up and was acted out by
sub-committees, op-eds and letters to the editor, the public’s attention would soon be drawn
to other items connected to the 90’s culture wars: The O.J. Simpson murder trial and the
Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing. The battle for history education and American
identity would now be fought without much fanfare.

On January 26, eight days after the pivotal Senate resolution renouncing the standards, an
article by Frank Rich was published in the New York Times opinion pages. Rich started his
piece by contrasting the fate o f the NEH-funded history standards with the mystery o f O.J.
Simpson’s innocence. “The mystery? This project was originally financed and guided by
none other than Mrs. Cheney, who called it her ‘single most important legacy’ and her
‘favorite grant’ before leaving the N.E.H. after the '92 election.”3 Rich was suspicious o f
Cheney’s motivation behind attacking the standards and her former agency. Was she acting
out o f personal conviction or, he questioned, “has she turned against her former agency so
she can play her own starring role in the culture war that the far right hopes to ride to the
White House?”4 Rich noted that days after Cheney’s first op-ed scathing the standards, Rush
Limbaugh took it up as a reason to abolish the NEH. And here Cheney sat, just a week after
the Senate voted not to federally certify the standards, using them as an excuse as to why the
NEH is unnecessary and needed to be abolished. Perhaps Cheney’s vocal criticism o f the
standards up to this point, Rich suggested, was merely a way to capitalize on the newfound
power o f conservatives in government. Rich’s article would attract a swift response.
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On January 30, Lynne Cheney responded to Rich’s opinion piece, declaring that it is
“fraught with distortions.”5 She noted twice how polite she had been at the hearings,
contrasting herself to the Democratic congressman David Skaggs, who dared suggest she had
exaggerated some o f her previous claims concerning the standards. In her brief letter to the
Editor, she explained how Rich had not accurately described her exchange with Skaggs; but
never spoke to his main point, that her motivation since October had been purely political.
She stood by her criticism o f the standards and used the letter as an opportunity to poke at
them again by reminding the readers that the Senate voted 99-1 against granting them federal
certification. She did not mention that the resolution was merely a rider amendment to the
Unfunded Mandates Bill, or that Democrats only voted for the amendment upon the
agreement that it would have no binding legal force. Her motives behind keeping that
information from the reader, one can only imagine. The Letter to the Editor notes that Lynne
Cheney was a Distinguished Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
Three days after Cheney’s editorial was published, two more appeared in the New
York Times under the banner, “Let’s Look at Biases in the History Standards.” In one, Sandra
Stotsky, research associate at Harvard’s Graduate School o f Education, criticizes Frank
Rich’s article for suggesting the standards are a “middle-of-the-road committee product.”6
She suspiciously left out that Rich also called them “imperfect” and “voluntary to boot,” two
important qualifiers. Selective quoting like that is a small way to control the appearance o f
one’s opponent.

5 Lynne Cheney, “History Standards Unsuitable for Schools,” The New York Times, January
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The main point o f Stotsky’s editorial was that the standards were clearly biased in the
questions they asked students to consider. In the author’s analysis, they contained loaded
phrases, loaded questions and one-sided questions that revealed a liberal bias for
multiculturalism and America-bashing. For example, the standards asked

“What major grievances have been advanced by spokespersons for
African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Hispanic Americans and native
Americans?”, with no corresponding questions asking, for example, how
Asian-Americans have advanced educationally and economically and the
reasons for their inter-marriage rates.7
If Stotsky’s argument says anything, it is that a history book or teacher asking about
the grievances different racial spokespersons in American history have had is a biased liberal
question, if not accompanied by a different question that makes sure to remind the student
that some people have it better in America now. She also somehow equated the first question
as being critical o f the U.S., despite no hint or supposition that any said grievance would be
justified. Most surprising to Stotsky was how “so many academic historians, high school
teachers and professional organizations created or approved such a biased document.”8 One
concludes she seemingly could not understand it because what they created was not what she
would have created on her own.
Accompanying that editorial was another written by Robert Costrell, professor of
economics at the University o f Massachusetts. Costrell set up his article as a response to
Frank Rich’s, demanding that Rich’s claim that the standards were “middle o f the road”
could not be supported. While Stotsky’s editorial mainly raised issues o f racial and social
liberal bias in the standards, Costrell noted perceived leftist economic bias. While focused on

the standards’ treatment o f the Great Depression’s causes, he noted “the standards' chief
explanation o f the Depression is what they dub the ‘trickle dow n’ economics o f Calvin
Coolidge.”9 Costrell concluded,

The standard is out o f step with both Keynesian and monetarist
research over the last few decades. The authors' focus on distributional
issues has clouded their treatment o f the Depression's causes, much as it
has distorted the economic history elsewhere in this imbalanced
document.10
It was a valid point. By not including other factors debated among historians as
having a hand in the demise o f the 1920s market, the standards dropped a ball. But, as a
response to Rich’s article this editorial lacked as well. Costrell did not acknowledge, just as
Stotsky’s had been careful not to, that Rich’s description o f the standards was not only
“middle o f the road,” but also “imperfect.”
Within the next two weeks, two editorials came out in support o f the standards. One
published on February 6 was written by Earl P. Bell, then-president o f the Organization of
History Teachers, a group which had been directly involved in the creation o f the documents.
He was cautious and tempered with any praise for the standards, supporting some revision
but not total dismissal. He merely clarified that when the Senate had resolved not to federally
certify them, it was with the understanding that “the Senate supports continuation o f the work
on the standards.” Bell quoted Senators Bingaman and Levin who had argued that the non
binding Resolution will not destroy the project to develop history standards. Bell hoped that
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“these clarifying statements document recognition that the future o f history in the schools
depends on the successful completion o f this project.” 11
So far The New York Times had not heard much from the supporters o f the standards,
only predominantly from its critics. That changed on February 13, when the editorial board
got involved with the debate. Written by an editor, the paper published an opinion piece
entitled, “Maligning the History Standards,” stating the paper’s stance on the issue. Noting
the intense conservative criticisms the standards had received, The New York Times declared
that any point they may have is small and misleading. “Reading the standards and support
materials is exhilarating. Students will rejoice in learning from them; teachers will cherish
using them.” 12 The paper’s editors celebrated not only the standards themselves, but even the
sample lessons that accompany them. The author then took note, just as Rich had, o f the
misleading tone of Cheney throughout the debate, and argued she “ridicules through
misrepresentation.”
Enumeration - McCarthy 19, Edison 0 - would make sense if the
standards were a textbook, a compendium o f all important facts. But the
sample lessons, from which the numbers are taken, are just that. Samples.
Teachers would fill in the blanks - 13
The real problem with the standards, the editors o f The New York Times argued, was
that it may have been too ambitious; asking for classroom activities like mock trials, debate,
and students doing lots o f original research is a lot to cram into limited class time. “Yet if this

11 Quotes in this paragraph were taken from Earl P. Bell, “Senate Wants History Panel to
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Government-sponsored project errs by demanding too much, that in itself might herald a
welcome change for American’s primary and secondary schools.” 14
The Gray Lady had spoken. A classic standard in American news had not only sided
with the standards, but had also criticized the bulk o f conservative condemnations as
overblown, and had personally called out Lynne Cheney for misrepresenting what was
actually found in the standards. Such a blow in favor o f the standards would not go
unanswered by their critics.
Almost a week later, John Fonte, Historian and ally o f Mrs. Cheney’s, responded to
the paper’s editorial with a short piece entitled, “Flawed History Standards Must Go.” Fonte
claimed the editors o f The New York Times had not admitted how much liberal bias is
actually inserted into the standards. The “problem is bias, exclusion and just plain bad
history, on practically every page o f both the United States and world history standards.” 15
To back up his claim, Fonte quoted Albert Shanker, then-president o f the AFT, the only
major organization that had been a part o f the standards’ development and which had
officially come out against them from the start. “America may be the first nation,” Fonte
quoted him as saying, “to teach a history that ‘leaves its children feeling negative about their
own country.’” 16 The use o f Shanker, president o f a teacher’s union, was a subtle maneuver
by Fonte to give the appearance that even left leaning organizations were against the
standards. However, Shanker was controversial in the world o f unions and was certainly no
leftist. In fact, throughout the whole development process, he and the AFT had lobbied for a
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more conservative, western-centric view o f U.S. and world histories. But o f course, the
public at large was not well acquainted with these important details. Fonte mainly argued that
the debate was not conservative v. liberal, but rather “objectivity versus bias.” He concluded
by driving home his point that there was no hope o f “revising a fundamentally flawed
document. U.C.L.A.’s history standards must go.” 17
Again, one sees an immediate response to any sign o f media support for the
standards. One also should note Fonte’s insistence on calling the standards “U.C.L.A.’s” to
fog the documents in a film o f liberal California; and also trying to rally Americans o f all
brands against the standards by denying it was ever conservative versus liberal, and by
quoting both Republican and Democratic congressmen.
The most important thing to note out o f these editorial exchanges between Rich and
The New York Times editors on the one hand and Cheney, Stotsky, Costrell and Fonte on the
other is not so much the arguments between them, but the connection between the latter four.
It is no coincidence that these four individuals would have editorials published around the
same time criticizing the history standards, a partial product o f the NEH, as the federal
government debated the pros and cons o f abolishing that same organization during the dawn
o f a conservative reign on Capitol Hill. It was part o f a conscious effort by an organization of
conservatives to rouse cultural passions and score political capital at a crucial point in time.
That organization was the American Enterprise Institute.
The AEI had recently formed the Committee to Review National Standards. The
woman who chaired it was also the woman to fire the first shot across the bow on October
20, 1994, Mrs. Lynne V. Cheney. And the Executive Director o f that committee was none

other than John Fonte. Attacks by them and conservative allies in the media and academia
had done well to stoke enough public outrage in different newspapers, on talk radio and even
television to lead to the Senate Resolution o f January 18. Then, on January 26, Frank Rich
opened up a front in the New York Times, a paper that had stayed relatively quiet in the
debate up until now, with his short article calling out Cheney for what appeared to be an
obvious political motivation for her sudden cultural crusade. Within a few days, the editors of
the opinion page had received letters from Cheney, Stotsky and Costrell; each o f whom were
members o f the A EI’s committee, and each o f them attacked the standards. Then, The New
York Times came out publicly in favor o f the standards being used in schools. Not
surprisingly, six days later John Fonte, Director o f that same committee, responds criticizing
the standards and framed the debate practically as America versus anti-American bias. It is
clear the four editorial responses were coordinated by the AEI committee in response to a
perceived public defense o f the standards. Rich and the editorial staff had touched a nerve
with a conservative think tank determined to see the standards defeated.

Wrapping It up

This is clear evidence that what developers and supporters o f the standards were
facing was not a spontaneous eruption o f criticisms bom out o f the interest o f actual
education reform; but rather an arranged attack by political actors with ulterior motivation to
portray the standards in an unflattering light. The reasons for doing so had been two-fold: in
the short-term, it would afford conservatives in government fodder in their fight to abolish
the NEH. They could hold up the discredited standards, pointing out that the NEH is the

organization responsible for such bias trash ruining children’s education and sense o f
patriotism. In the long term, it was another battle in the culture wars, a chance to swing
public opinion to the right when it came to issues o f American identity. This cultural struggle
over what it means to be American has been raging since the pro-French and pro-British
debates o f the post-Revolutionary War period; and it has continued long after the national
history standards debate. But we can now see how this episode in our history was clearly
used as a means to effect cultural debate, and in so doing, effect the political climate.
We know that the conservative goal o f abolishing the NEH did not succeed. Whether
the national history standards debate paid off for conservatives in the long term is up to
historians o f the future to debate if they wish. What is apparent is that in the short term, their
efforts had succeeded in killing off an attempt at history education reform, and thus a chance
to challenge or reshape American identity, a concept that had been slowly fracturing and
splintering already.
On April 19, 1995, the Oklahoma City Federal Building was bombed and questions
o f whether battles over our culture and the role o f Government had gone too far quieted the
culture war for a short time. The debate over the standards became muted in the media. When
the NCHS re-released the standards in 1996 after making reforms suggested by the CBE
(mainly consisting o f dropping the sample lessons), a few op-eds were published, but most o f
them were celebratory. The battle had ended. The re-released standards were not met with
much fanfare, and did not become the big success the developers had hoped the original
documents would.
What is now an almost forgotten small chapter in the history o f education reform is
more important than first meets the eye. This thesis has shown it to be a window into how

cultural manipulation can be a conscious act by prominent and influential individuals, just as
cultural pessimists like T. J. Lears have described. This paper reveals the pivotal role
individuals at the AEI played in combating the standards and portraying them negatively in
the media, and conservatives were able to effectively steer a public conversation about our
nation’s education and cultural values in their favor, if only for a brief moment.
The national history standards controversy was an example o f Gramscian theories o f
culture at work. Cheney and other conservatives used the cultural symbol o f history as a
political function in an attempt to effect sympathy and gamer political capital at a watershed
moment in congressional history.
The standards’ developers had hoped to revamp the outdated history still taught in
many classrooms in the 1990s. A history o f mainly white men, o f Consensus Theory from
the 1950s. No one had expected their attempts at reform to be hijacked by political players
with an agenda. But this episode shows us that it can happen, and often does. As much as we
like to think culture is just an organic outgrowth o f a people with shared values, the national
history standards controversy can reveal just how easily, with a pluck o f a single chord, that
sense o f shared culture can be thrown into tumult and be used by those in power.
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